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Abstract 
This article refines Lipsky’s (1980) assertion that resource scarcity negatively affects output 
delivery. It uses fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis to analyse the nuanced interplay 
of contextual and individual determinants of the output performance of Swiss veterinary 
inspectors as street-level bureaucrats (SLBs). Moving ‘beyond Lipsky’, the study builds on 
recent theoretical contributions and systematically compares SLBs across organizational 
contexts. Against a widespread assumption, performance is not all about the resources. The 
impact of perceived available resources hinges on caseloads, which prove to be more decisive. 
These contextual factors interact with individual attitudes emerging from the SLBs’ diverse 
accountabilities. The results put the often-emphasized importance of worker-client interaction 
into context. In a setting where clients cannot escape the interaction, SLBs are not primarily 
held accountable by them. Studies of street-level performance should thus sensibly consider 
gaps between what is being demanded of and offered to SLBs, and the latter’s multiple 
embeddedness. 
 
Keywords: Street-level bureaucracy, public service gap, public accountability, output 
performance, Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA)
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Introduction 
This article studies the interplay of contextual and individual determinants of the performance 
of street-level bureaucrats. Public servants are often expected to provide services in contexts 
where they are not given the resources to do so adequately (Lipsky 1980). Street-level 
bureaucrats are typically urged to maximize output while also minimizing cost: to ensure the 
prudent use of taxpayer money, budgets are limited and performance targets introduced 
(Tummers et al. 2012b). Situations may occur when the policy or the clients require the street-
level bureaucrats to do something that is not possible given the available resources (Dias and 
Maynard-Moody 2007, p. 191; Brodkin 2011). As a result, public policies might not be 
implemented in ways that resolve the policy problem, or services might not be delivered such 
that target groups are served. Resource scarcity hence crucially interferes with the effective 
implementation of policies at the street-level (Lipsky 1980). Particularly pressures for 
efficiency under New Public Management reforms and the current increased austerity 
measures create a need for a better understanding of these interferences (Hupe and Van der 
Krogt 2013, pp. 61-62). Research suggests that street-level bureaucrats virtually always face 
resource limitations (Kosar 2011), and that this strongly affects the attitudes and behaviour of 
caseworkers (Riccucci et al. 2004; Brodkin 2012).  
However, frontline workers’ discretion when delivering output is a multi-faceted phenomenon 
(Meyers and Vorsanger 2003, p. 245). Multiple accountabilities guide and constrain the street-
level bureaucrats’ use of discretion (Hupe and Hill 2007). Street-level bureaucrats are faced 
with various demands from their environment (Hupe and Buffat 2014). Policies require them 
to perform output tasks; their organizations provide them with resources to do so; clients want 
them to take their situation into account; professional peers establish good practices (Hupe 
and Hill 2007). Caseloads matter (Brodkin 2011): when insufficient resources are coupled 
with a high workload, street-level bureaucrats are required to ‘do more with less’. Such a 
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mismatch between resources and the demands of work has been conceptualized by Hupe and 
Buffat (2014) as a ‘public service gap’. Empirical studies suggest that this is particularly 
detrimental for output delivery (Brodkin 2012, p. 944). Conversely, street-level bureaucrats 
may not automatically perform as prescribed when the resources suffice. They might face 
other conflicting or competing demands; for example, the policy might require them to act 
against professional standards. The role of resources is hence context-dependent and mediated 
by the individual perceptions and dilemmas of street-level bureaucrats (Johansson 2012).  
It is therefore not enough to state that ‘resources are usually inadequate in street-level 
bureaucracies’ (Lipsky 1980, p. 29). Instead, this paper explores how the influence of a public 
service gap on street-level performance depends on the street-level bureaucrats‘ policy 
alienation (Tummers 2012) and role conflicts (Tummers et al. 2012b). Thereby, the article 
moves ‘beyond Lipsky’ and applies and tests recent conceptualizations of the core notions of 
street-level bureaucracy. The paper analyses the output performance of 19 Swiss constituent 
state (cantonal) public veterinarians. Output performance is conceived as compliance with the 
targets for inspections on livestock farms in 2010, as set out by the Swiss Ordinance on 
Veterinary Medicinal Products (OVMP) (X 2012).  
Implementation research faces the challenge to capture the cases’ particularities while still 
producing some modest level of generalization. The ‘complexity of implementation processes 
and the influences of multiple, interacting factors on street-level workers’ (Meyers and 
Vorsanger 2003, p. 245) has led to a predominance of case studies (Meyers and Vorsanger 
2003, p. 251). As a consequence, ‘little comparative research on street-level bureaucracy that 
draws inferences across organizational contexts’ has been conducted (Hupe and Buffat 2014, 
p. 549). This paper intends to contribute to an ‘agenda for street-level bureaucracy research 
with a more systematic comparative logic’ (Hupe and Buffat 2014, p. 549). Its contribution 
lies, first, in emphasizing the role of context, in terms of what is being asked of street-level 
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bureaucrats in relation to what is offered to them. The paper studies how context interacts 
with individual factors. This article hence conceives of output performance as a multilayer 
phenomenon. Performance can have several distinct explanations that consist of 
configurations of diverse factors. This facilitates, second, to take into account the ‘multiple 
embeddedness’ of street-level bureaucrats (Hupe and Hill 2007, p. 291). Empirically, third, 
this study compares street-level bureaucrats across organizational contexts (Winter 2003, pp. 
216-217, 221; Hupe and Buffat 2014) by using the method of fuzzy-set Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) (Ragin 2000).  
Resource constraints alone prove not to be as harmful as often assumed (Kosar 2011). The 
results underscore the importance of a public service gap for output performance. 
Unexpectedly, the workload faced by street-level bureaucrats proves more decisive than the 
budgetary and personnel resources they report to have at hand. The influence of these factors 
is mediated by the street-level bureaucrats’ individual perceptions: first, of the policy’s 
compatibility with professional values and second, of its contribution to societal goals. 
Conversely, street-level bureaucrats who mostly allocate sanctions are not primarily held 
accountable by their clients in a setting where the latter cannot escape the interaction.  
The paper proceeds accordingly: in the next section, I elaborate on the theoretical foundations 
of factors influencing output delivery in street-level bureaucracies, and I derive three 
hypotheses about these influences. A brief presentation of the example of the OVMP, the 
method and research design follows. I then present the results and conclude with a discussion 
of their implications. 
 
Street-level performance: Is it really all about the resources? 
‘There is always an implicit tension between resource constraints and the inexplorable 
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demands for public services.’ 
Michael Lipsky (1980, p. 172) 
 
The term ‘street-level bureaucrat’ refers to agents who implement public policies and ‘interact 
with and have wide discretion over the dispensation of beneﬁts or the allocation of public 
sanctions’ (Lipsky 1980, p. xi), such as cops, teachers and counsellors (Moody and Musheno 
2003). This study looks at veterinary inspectors as street-level bureaucrats. The work of these 
veterinary inspectors is crucially characterized by direct interaction with livestock farmers as 
clients (Brodkin 2012), relatively high degrees of discretion and a relative autonomy from 
organizational authority (Hupe and Hill 2007, p. 280). Street-level bureaucrats work at the 
interface between target groups and the state. As a consequence, they can significantly 
influence how public policies are put into practice (Lipsky 1980; Meyers and Vorsanger 2003, 
p. 246). For example, some inspectors are known to be more rigourous or consultative than 
others during controls (XY 2014). This study applies a relatively narrow conception of output 
performance (cf. Brodkin 2011). It asks whether and why the output goals set out by the 
policy are met by an street-level bureaucrat (Hupe and Hill 2007, p. 294) – specifically, 
whether the veterinary inspectors control the required number of livestock farms per year. 
Compliance with output goals has a timeless relevance and the advantages of visibility and 
comparability (Winter 2003, pp. 217ff).  
A proper understanding of frontline implementation requires knowledge about the work 
context and pressures street-level bureaucrats experience (Johansson 2012; Lipksy 1980). 
Discretion – in other words, the freedom to act - is inherent in street-level bureaucracies, and 
simultaneously ‘always constrained’ (Hupe and Van der Krogt 2013, p. 59). Street-level 
bureaucrats are embedded within multiple accountabilities. Accountability refers to social 
relationships in which the street-level bureaucrats feel an obligation to explain and to justify 
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their conduct to some significant other (Hupe and Hill 2007, p. 286). The state, but also the 
profession and society provide street-level bureaucrats with norms and demands for expected 
behavior. These norms, called action prescription, guide the street-level bureaucrats’ 
behaviour (Hupe and Van der Krogt 2013; Hupe and Buffat 2014). This study focuses on the 
required number of inspections as the formal caseload imposed by the state (Meyers and 
Vorsanger 2003, p. 249). However, demands on street-level bureaucrats can also stem from 
professional norms, e.g. good practices, and expectations from the society or target groups 
(Hupe and Buffat 2014, p. 557).  
Street-level bureaucrats attempt to meet these multiple demands stemming from their 
environment. However, institutional incentives and resources crucially establish the 
boundaries within which they can act (Brodkin 1997). Action resources denote a ‘range of 
acts that enable street-level bureaucrats to fulfil their tasks, (…) such as training, education, 
professional experience, time, information, staff, and last but not least, the budget itself’ 
(Hupe and Buffat 2014, p. 557). The focus here is on ‘hard’ public budgetary and personnel 
resources. However, broader views of resources include time, skills, knowledge and 
understanding (Riccucci et al. 2004). As the above quote illustrates, Lipsky (1980) states a 
chronical problem of demand and supply in street-level bureaucracies. The latter 
‘characteristically provide fewer resources than necessary for workers to do their job 
adequately’. As a consequence, street-level bureaucrats ‘typically cannot fulfill their 
mandated responsibilities’ (Lipsky 1980, p. 29). Lipsky essentially assumes that the street-
level bureaucrats’ mode of coping with such resource scarcities will be to ‘do what they can’ 
(Brodkin 1997, p. 24), which results in an implementation failure. A first hypothesis captures 
this assumption: 
 
H1: Resource scarcity leads street-level bureaucrats to perform deficiently. 
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This statement grants resources a very high importance: it also implies that street-level 
bureaucrats need sufficient resources to perform appropriately. Yet bureaucrats deal with 
work pressures in manifold ways (e.g., Brodkin 2011; Hupe and Van der Krogt 2013). In the 
light of the multiple embeddedness of street-level bureaucrats, Lipsky’s (1980) assertion 
should be tested and refined. Under what circumstances do resource inadequacies affect 
street-level performance? Are resource constraints really a sufficient condition for lacking 
performance, or do other factors compensate for them? Does it follow that adequate resources 
motivate street-level bureaucrats to perform well? According to Lipsky (1980, p. 33), ‘the 
salience of solutions to problems of resource inadequacy varies not only with the demands on 
services and the resources available, but also with the importance to an individual of deriving 
a satisfactory solution to these problems’. This statement has two implications relevant for 
this study.  
First, resource constraints should be understood as the discrepancy between the goals to be 
attained and the means provided for doing so. Such a public service gap ‘occurs when what is 
required of street-level bureaucrats exceeds what is provided to them for the fulfilment of 
their tasks’ (Hupe and Buffat 2014, p. 557). This should be particularly detrimental to output 
delivery (Brodkin 2012). The notion of a public service gap explicitly conceptualizes tensions 
between supply and demand as a relative statement. This enables a comparison across 
contexts (Hupe and Buffat 2014). The public service gap links existing results on the 
influence of resources (e.g., Brodkin 1997; Riccucci et al. 2004) and of caseloads (e.g., Dias 
and Maynard-Moody 2007; Brodkin 2011) on street-level performance. Second, Lipsky 
(1980) indeed implies that street-level bureaucrats can be more or less susceptible to the 
resource constraints they are facing: individual factors mediate their relevance. A second 
hypothesis hence links the interplay of a public service gap with individual perceptions to 
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performance (Johansson 2012): 
 
H2: In combination with unfavourable attitudes, high action prescriptions lead to deficient 
performance if the action resources do not suffice to meet these demands. 
 
Referring to these attitudes, I now discuss the ways street-level bureaucrats perceive the 
action prescriptions of the state, the profession and society, and the context in which they use 
their discretion.  
 
Policy alienation, role conflicts and context 
Personal characteristics and subjective experiences influence decisions made at the street-
level. Different attitudes may lead to different ‘styles’ of rule application (Winter 2003, p. 
219; Tummers et al. 2012a). Specifically, that implementers identify with the policy is a 
prerequisite for effective implementation (May and Winter 2009). The street-level 
bureaucrat’s expectation to make a difference for real societal problems acts as an important 
accountability mechanism (Hupe and Van der Krogt 2013, p. 62). In this vein, policy 
alienation denotes the ‘psychological disconnection from the policy program being 
implemented by a public professional who interacts directly with clients on a regular basis’ 
(Tummers 2012, p. 516). Street-level bureaucrats with high levels of policy alienation have 
proven less willing to support the implementation of the policy (Tummers 2012). For 
instance, a veterinary inspector who thinks that the OVMP does not improve food safety 
might make little effort to control compliance with the regulations. Out of the two dimensions 
of policy alienation, Tummers (2012) finds only a weak correlation of feelings of 
powerlessness with implementation willingness. Consequently, I focus on policy 
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meaninglessness, conceived as the lack of an added-value of the policy to socially relevant 
goals (societal meaninglessness) and for the clients (client meaninglessness).  
Besides identifying with policies to different degrees, street-level bureaucrats also interact 
with diverse reference groups. These interactions create roles, which in turn generate 
requirements for behaviour that legitimize the use of discretion. Accountability is not only 
practised in vertical relations such as managerial control, but, ‘essentially multiple’ (Moody 
and Musheno 2003, p. 20; Hupe and Hill 2007, p. 279). A lack of compatibility between 
multiple demands from different role providers can create role conflicts. Such role conflicts 
affect the willingness to perform (Tummers et al. 2012b). Street-level expertise is practised in 
horizontal relations with the wider circle of professionals as a first reference group. This leads 
to ‘professional accountability’. Professional, ‘ethical’ values shape how the street-level 
bureaucrats conceive their own role. Professional values are an important basis upon which 
street-level bureaucrats decide how to manage their work (Lipsky 1980, p. 147). Such values 
also help street-level bureaucrats to overcome the challenges met during implementation 
(Hupe and Van der Krogt 2013, pp. 56-57). This can create some kind of self-binding 
mechanisms or ‘defences against discretion’ (Hupe and Hill 2007, pp. 282-283, 289). For 
example, veterinary inspectors are trained veterinarians. As such, they are aware of the 
importance of cleaning technical feeding facilities after every use to prevent antibiotic 
resistances, even if the livestock farmers complain that the rules are overly strict. However, 
policy-professional role conflicts can occur when ‘professionals tasked with implementing a 
policy perceive the role requirements demanded by the policy contents to be incongruent with 
their professional attitudes, values and behaviour’ (Tummers et al. 2012b, p. 4). For example, 
a veterinary inspector may think that the content of the required inspections actually makes 
little sense.  
The policy adressees are the second reference group of street-level bureaucrats. Hupe and Hill 
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(2007, p. 290) refer to ‘participatory accountability’ when saying that ‘the latter hold the 
former accountable but the opposite can be assumed to happen as well.’ For example, the 
livestock holders might urge the inspectors to consider that the OVMP is hard to implement 
both correctly and cost-effectively. Policy-client role conflicts occur when the street-level 
bureaucrats perceive the role behaviour demanded by their clients to be incongruent with the 
role behaviour demanded by the policy content (Tummers et al. 2012b, pp. 4, 13). If a street-
level bureaucrat faces policy-professional or policy-client role conflicts, then it reduces 
implementation willingness (Tummers et al. 2012b). 
Lipksy (1980, p. 47) argues that street-level bureaucrats are not primarily held accountable by 
their clients. Clients are usually non-voluntary; for instance, the livestock farmers cannot 
choose which inspector controls them, and the inspections are compulsory. Since they cannot 
escape the relationship, clients are not in a position to effectively discipline the street-level 
bureaucrat (XY 2014). For example, Keiser (2010) finds that street-level bureaucrats’ 
decisions are hardly influenced by their evaluation of the clients in the absence of face-to-face 
interaction. Hupe and Hill (2007, p. 294) assume that public-administrative accountability is 
more predominant than participatory accountability in ‘performance’ modes of 
implementation. I hence expect Swiss street-level bureaucrats to be held accountable more by 
the state, their professional peers and broader society than by their clients: 
 
H3: Action prescriptions and resources, policy alienation and policy-professional role 
conflicts are more relevant for output performance than policy-client role conflicts.  
 
Besides the contextual and individual factors mentioned above, the working context of street-
level bureaucrats is structured by the institutional and policy design. This in turn varies on a 
range of dimensions that determine the situations in which street-level bureaucrats decide on 
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their use of, and the extent to which they have, discretion (Hupe and Hill 2007, p. 281). First, 
the ‘what’ factor (Tummers et al. 2012a): street-level bureaucracies differ in terms of 
professions, of policies and tasks carried out, and of the involved agencies (Hupe and Hill 
2007, p. 284). This points to the ‘where’ factor in terms of the implementing organization’s 
characteristics (Tummers et al. 2012a; Garrow and Grusky 2013; Hupe and Van der Krogt 
2013, pp. 59-60). Political attention and managerial factors weakly influence output behaviour 
(May and Winter 2009, p. 469). Oversight structures and political control serve to align the 
interests of implementing agents with policy making principals (Meyers and Vorsanger 2003, 
pp. 245-246). At the macro level, implementation contexts differ across political-
administrative settings and specific implementation arrangements (Hupe and Buffat 2014). As 
I argue below, the design of this study holds most of these factors constant. 
 
-- Table 1 about here – 
 
Based on these theoretical and empirical insights, Table 1 summarizes the conditions for 
performance. Especially when evaluating H2, I seek to exploratively discover how action 
prescriptions and action resources as contextual factors interact with individual perceptions. 
Hence, I am not interested in the single conditions’ discrete effects. Notwithstanding, the 
direction of their influence should be as expected in the second column of Table 1. Surprising 
results then provide opportunities for further explorations to refine theory (Rihoux and Ragin 
2009). This procedure is applied to an illustrative type of street-level bureaucracy within the 
context of federal Switzerland, namely the decentralized implementation structure of the 
OVMP. 
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Veterinary inspections on Swiss livestock farms 
During the last two decades, a host of food scandals related to animal diseases have increased 
the regulatory importance of food safety issues. One instance of this is the OVMP, which 
came into force in 2004 to ensure human and animal health. It regulates the supply and use of 
veterinary drugs for livestock. The livestock owners (farmers) as target group often administer 
the medications, supplied by veterinarians, to the animals single-handedly. The OVMP 
mandates that the public veterinarians of the 22 cantonal (regional) veterinary offices inspect 
each livestock farm every ten years to detect and sanction infringements of its provisions. 
Veterinary premises are presumably inspected every five years, but no official data exist. 
There are only 22 offices because the four ‘Urkantone’ share one veterinary office. The same 
goes for Appenzell Innerrhodes and Ausserrhodes, and Basel City and Basel Land. 
Liechtenstein is subject to the OVMP and treated as ‘canton’ henceforth.  
The inspections on livestock farms serve to check compliance with several agricultural 
regulations. Amongst them are the privisions of the OVMP concerning the correct storage and 
use of veterinary drugs and the documentation thereof, including the drugs’ labelling and 
inventory. Public veterinarians are responsible for carrying out the required inspections in 
their canton, and allocating sanctions for infringements. They interact directly and regularly 
with the clients when visiting farms, checking the livestock, the documents and the drugs’ 
storage, and taking samples (XY 2014). The OVMP’s target only concerns control 
frequencies. The cantonal implementation laws differ slightly regarding the arrangement of 
the inspections, but hardly their content (X 2012, p. 95). 
 
-- Figure 1 about here – 
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There are strong indications that the public veterinarians use their discretion: Instead of the 
target of ten per cent, only 6.24 per cent of Swiss livestock farms have been monitored, on 
average, from 2004 to 2010 (ISVET). The lack of substantial differences between years 
precludes a cohort effect. A closer look at output delivery in 2010 (Figure 1) reveals large 
differences in the extent to which the cantonal veterinarians meet the OVMP’s inspection 
target. This is the outcome I aim to explain.  
These cantonal differences occur in the following context: all street-level bureaucrats have a 
comparable professional background, high discretion and organizational autonomy. They are 
subject to the identical regime of (lacking) public-administrative accountability (Hupe and 
Hill 2007, p. 288). Political oversight over these street-level bureaucrats is virtually absent: 
the Federal Veterinary Office publishes the data on the implementation of the inspections on 
livestock farms in a national database (ISVET). However, there are no enforcement measures 
against veterinary offices that do not comply with their control function (X 2012, p. 19ff). All 
public veterinarians are trained veterinarians and practitioners, not primarily managers (XY 
2014).  
Cantonal differences prevail in the number of livestock premises, the available resources and 
the interaction with clients. Between 305 and 6053 livestock farms exist in the assessed 
cantons, ten per cent of which must be inspected per year. The overall staff of cantonal 
veterinary offices comprises between one to fourty persons. The personnel resources for the 
inspections of the OVMP range from 20 to 280 per cent of one full-time employee, with a 
budget of between 7500 and 600‘000 Swiss franks (X 201, p. 26). Veterinary offices also 
grant permits upon charge. Specifically the larger offices also offer information and 
counselling services, but inspections are the public veterinarians’ main task. The power 
relationship between inspectors allocating sanctions and the inspectees is asymmetric. This 
might imply that they practise lower levels of participatory accountability than street-level 
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bureaucrats in service delivery (XY 2014).  
 
Data and methods 
This paper relies on semi-structured telephone interviews. These were conducted during the 
formative evaluation of the OVMP for the Swiss Federal Office of Public Health in spring 
2012 (X 2012) in each veterinary office with the chief public veterinarian. The latter regularly 
and personally carry out inspections on livestock farms. Ticino and Zug did not participate; 
the respondent in Bern assumed office after 2010 (N = 19). The interviews comprised 85 
closed and 25 open questions, lasted between one and three hours and were audio-recorded. 
Topics covered the respondents’ general judgement of the OVMP and its instruments, the 
judgement and implementation of the control arrangement, the actor competencies, the roles 
of the public veterinarians and their experiences and relationship with the clients (X 2012, p. 
83). The cantons are named alphabetically to ensure the respondents’ anonymity. 
Due to their contextual similarity as outlined above, the comparison of Swiss cantons 
facilitates to focus on selected determinants of output behaviour (Rihoux and Ragin 2009, pp. 
22, 28). The Swiss cantons share their institutional and cultural macro-context and political-
administrative settings. I compare street-level bureaucrats who enact the same policy within 
the same type of organization. Narrowing the number of relevant causal factors is a 
prerequisite for using Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). QCA is increasingly applied 
to comparatively study complex social phenomena (Rihoux et al. 2011). The method entails 
the assumption that appropriate performance can have a different explanation than deficient 
performance (causal asymmetry). ‘The assumption of equifinality allows for different, 
mutually non-exclusive explanations of the same phenomenon. Instead of assuming isolated 
effects of single variables, the assumption of conjunctural causation foresees the effect of a 
single condition unfolding only in combination with other (…) conditions’ (Schneider and 
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Wagemann 2012, p. 78, emphasis in the original). QCA is suitable for analysing intermediate 
numbers of cases. Since I seek to disentangle the nuanced interplay of action prescriptions 
with action resources and other factors, I consider QCA the appropriate method for the 
analysis. 
QCA is a set-theoretic method: cases have membership in sets which represent variables, 
e.g.,in the set of ‘appropriate performance’. FsQCA (Ragin 2000), which is applied here, 
allows cases that display features to different degrees. FsQCA hence integrates a certain 
probabilistic element. QCA identifies complex combinations of conditions (configurations, 
paths) that are necessary and/or sufficient for an outcome. An explanation X is necessary () 
for the appropriate performance if appropriate performance cannot occur without X. X is 
sufficient () for appropriate performance if X always leads to appropriate performance.  
The method has been described by Rihoux and Ragin (2009) and Schneider and Wagemann 
(2012). Based on a dialogue with the cases and theory, the membership of each case is first 
determined in each set (a process called ‘calibration’), and then in each logically possible 
configuration. The entirety of these configurations are represented in the rows of a ‘truth 
table’. During the following ‘logical minimization’ process, the shortest possible causal 
expression for the configurations causing the outcome is formulated – the solution term. The 
basic idea is that if an outcome D is present in a case displaying A, B and C as well as in 
another case which displays A and C, but not B, then it does not make a difference for the 
occurrence of D whether B is present or not. Subsequently, capital letters are used to indicate 
that a feature is present, while lower case letters denote its absence. FsQCA uses the logical 
operators ‘or’ (+) and ‘and’ (*) of Boolean algebra. Hence, if we observed that A*B*C + 
A*b*C  D, then this can be minimized to A*C  D. I use the fsQCA 2.5 software and 
follow the Enhanced Standard Analysis procedure (ESA). I hence make theoretically 
informed directional expectations for single conditions (Table 1), and I make sure that no 
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combination of conditions is assumed to lead both to appropriate and deficient performance 
(Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 167ff, 200ff). The raw data and fuzzy set scores (Tables A 
and B), the complex and parsimonious solution terms, truth tables and directional 
expectations (Tables D and E) are reported in the online appendix. 
There are two performance indicators for the results, both ranging from zero to one. The basis 
upon which appropriate thresholds for these indicators are chosen should be research-specific 
(Schneider and Wagemann 2010, p. 406). Consistency measures the degree to which the 
statement of sufficiency or necessity is in line with the empirical evidence. Consistency 
sufficiency can be indicated for truth table rows (raw consistency), single paths of, or the 
whole solution term. When choosing appropriate raw consistency levels, I checked for ‘gaps’ 
in the raw and PRI consistency values and the presence of contradictory cases with 
qualitatively different membership in the configuration and the outcome. Coverage then 
indicates to what extent the observations are explained by the configurations. Raw coverage 
expresses how much of the outcome is covered by a single path, solution coverage does the 
same for the solution term, while unique coverage indicates how much a path uniquely 
covers. Based on interview excerpts, I discuss typical cases, unexplained cases and 
contradictory cases, which display qualitatively different membership scores in a truth table 
row and the outcome (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, pp. 127-128, 139, 143ff) . Open 
answers were translated from German and French by the author.  
 
Measurement and calibration 
I now turn to the measurement and calibration of the outcome and conditions, as resumed in 
Table 2. Closed survey questions were used to operationalize all attitude conditions. Using the 
direct calibration method (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, pp. 35-38), set membership ranges 
from 0 (e.g., fully deficient performance) to 1 (fully appropriate performance) with a 
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crossover point at 0.5 (neither deficient nor appropriate performance). Contrary to usual 
measurement scales, the crossover point is decisive: a membership of above 0.5 indicates that 
a feature is more present than absent (more appropriate than deficient performance), whereas 
fuzzy membership of less than 0.5 means that the feature is rather to fully absent (Ragin 
2000). 
Performance, measured as the per cent of farms in a canton that were inspected in 2010, is 
appropriate (PERF) if a canton practically complies with the inspection target (at least 8.5 per 
cent), and deficient (perf) if the percentage of inspected farms is below 1.5. The crossover 
point of 5.8 per cent expresses whether a canton performed above or below average in 2010. 
Action prescriptions is a measure of the caseloads, specifically, the ten per cent of the total 
number of farms to be inspected in a canton. In the absence of a meaningful theoretical 
criterion, the calibration expresses whether these numbers are high compared to other cantons 
(PRES), or low (pres). The crossover point of 275 was chosen due to a gap in the values 
slightly above the sample average. For the measure for action resources, the respondents 
indicated, on a scale from 1 to 4, whether their personnel and budgetary resources were 
sufficient or rather sufficient (RES), or rather insufficient or insufficient (res) for performing 
the inspections (crossover point 2.5). A public service gap prevails when objectively high 
caseloads combine with the street-level bureaucrat’s subjective perception of resource 
scarcity; formally, PRES*res. 
Societal meaninglessness is measured via the street-level bureaucrat’s appraisal of the extent 
to which two rules related to his or her duties contribute to the OVMP’s overarching goals. 
The responses are added into one index ranging from societal meaningfulness (sm) to societal 
meaninglessness (SM). In terms of client meaninglessness, the OVMP contains two major 
provisions, which specifically regulate the farmers’ everyday use of the medicine. The street-
level bureaucrats indicated whether they perceived these two provisions as useful (cm) or not 
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(CM). To address a possible social desirability response bias emerging from a tendency to 
avoid open criticism, I consider added-values of 5 resulting from one ‘rather positive’ and 
another ‘rather negative’ response already as more meaningless than meaningful. I thus set the 
crossover point at 4.5. I follow this procedure for setting the crossover point for all conditions 
that consist of an eight-value index. 
If the number and the content of inspections do not make sense to the street-level bureaucrat, 
then conducting the inspections cannot seem sensible to him or her (8-value index). This leads 
to a policy-professional role conflict (PC). A policy-client conflict prevails if the street-level 
bureaucrat finds it impossible for the livestock farmers to implement the provisions of the 
OVMP (CC), which is what he or she monitors and sanctions during inspections. The 
calibration is parallel to the one for RES, with an index value of 4 (not realizable) 
corresponding to a full conflict. 
 
-- Table 2 about here – 
 
Resource constraints: omni-present and detrimental? 
I first assess necessary conditions for deficient and appropriate performance. The assumption 
still prevails that resources for street-level bureaucracies seldom suffice to meet demand 
(Kosar 2011). I contest this claim to a degree with my data on the Swiss street-level 
bureaucrats: only one third of them complain about insufficient resources, and a public 
service gap is a rare phenomenon prevailing in only four cantons. Indeed, no single necessary 
condition for output performance was detected (Table C online appendix). Figure 2 illustrates 
that perceived sufficient resources do not necessarily make street-level bureaucrats perform 
appropriately. Furthermore, perceived resource scarcity is far from consistently leading to 
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deficient output performance. Hypothesis 1 has hence been refuted: it is not all about the 
resources. The pattern for high and low caseloads is similar. In the cantons E, O and Q, a 
public service gap is indeed associated with deficient performance, whereas J faces a public 
service gap, but still performs appropriately. 
 
-- Figure 2 about here – 
 
Deficient performance and the public service gap 
What leads the cantonal public veterinarians in Switzerland to not perform the required 
number of inspections? The second and third columns in the first row of Table 3 illustrate the 
two paths that are sufficient for deficient performance. The consistency and coverage 
indicators for the single paths, as well as for the overall intermediate solution term, are listed 
below. The second row indicates the cantons that display the respective combination of 
factors. High action prescriptions or low resources are prominent in both scenarios, pointing 
to their crucial relevance. 
 
-- Table 3 about here – 
 
In three cantons (path 1), the street-level bureaucrat faces a public service gap: action 
prescriptions are high (PRES) and resources insufficient (res). The street-level bureaucrat 
thinks that the OVMP’s regulations are realizable for the clients (cc), but finds the regulations 
unsuitable to achieve the overarching goals (SM), and useless for the clients (CM). The public 
veterinarian from O narrates how the accumulated effect of these factors makes it is nearly 
impossible, but also seemingly unnecessary, to comply with the inspection requirements: 
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‘Yes, the number of inspections that we perform is insufficient (…) the reason is that we lack 
personnel for controlling so many farms. (…) The existing control system is expensive and 
serves for little. (…) the implementation of the written agreement is sometimes rather 
symbolic and of little added value for the farmers (…) The burden for livestock holders to 
document the use of drugs is rather reasonable, but in large livestock farms, they often don’t 
do it to spare the effort. In a regular inspection, it is hardly feasible to check such huge piles 
of papers. It’s also really not relevant for us.’ 
Interview, 4.1.2012. 
 
The single canton A (path 2) is amongst the cantons with the most agricultural sites (PRES) 
and the street-level bureaucrat’s identification with inspection duties is low (PC). In this 
context, the street-level bureaucrat’s perception that the regulations are not realizable for the 
farmers (CC) adds to deficient performance. The street-level bureaucrat emphasizes the 
accumulated demotivating effect of the high action prescriptions, specifically the complexity 
and amount – with a resulting lack of time - of work: 
 
‘The documentation requirements urgently need to be loosened (…) They’re too complex and 
time-consuming, both for the livestock holders who have to do it, and for us to control it. We 
would really accomplish the same with less.’  
Interview, 3.1.2012. 
 
The results partly support hypothesis 2: the interplay of high action prescriptions with 
unfavourable attitudes leads to deficient performance. However, unexpectedly, path 2 shows 
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that high action prescriptions do not have to combine with a perceived lack of resources to 
lead to deficient performance. Furthermore, in favour of hypothesis 3, the role of a policy-
client conflict is ambiguous and context-dependent.  
 
-- Figure 3 about here -- 
 
The low solution coverage suggests that the assessed factors have quite a limited ability to 
explain deficient performance. Figure 3 visualizes the cases’ membership in the solution term 
and the outcome set. The fact that there are no contradictory cases highlights the good 
consistency of this solution. However, the four cases situated in the upper left quadrant – half 
of all cantons performing deficiently – still require explanation. 
 
Low caseloads and appropriate performance 
What are the sufficient conditions for appropriate performance? Table 4 shows three different 
paths that lead the street-level bureaucrats to perform the required inspections. The absence of 
a public service gap implies that there are either low caseloads or sufficient resources 
(formally, pres + RES) (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, p. 82). This is the case in all three 
paths; thus, the absence of a public service gap is an essential part of the story why Swiss 
street-level bureaucrats perform appropriately. It catches the eye that low caseloads are 
empirically much more relevant han sufficient action resources. 
 
-- Table 4 about here -- 
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The perception that resources suffice (RES) is only causally relevant in P (path 3). In addition, 
the street-level bureaucrat conceives the policy as meaningful (sm*cm) and does not face a 
policy-professional role conflict (pc). Hence, thinking that the clients cannot easily comply 
with the policy (CC), the street-level bureaucrat does monitor them. Professional values 
appear more decisive for this street-level bureaucrat than the clients’ needs.  
In line with hypothesis 3, the roles of both conditions that refer to the clients (client 
meaninglessness and policy-client role conflict) are ambivalent. If resource constraints or 
caseloads are low and the professional can identify with the duties to be carried out, then the 
thought that the OVMP’s regulations are hard to implement for farmers (CC) makes the 
street-level bureaucrat perform appropriately. This is also the case in two small, 
mountainious, French-speaking cantons (path 1). The cantonal veterinarian of I explains how, 
since action prescriptions are low (pres) and a policy-professional role conflict is absent (pc), 
the inspections are used as an opportunity to improve target group behaviour: 
 
‘The requirements to count stocks are not equally suitable for all types of livestock farms (…) 
we should take the time to explain their usefulness to the livestock owners.’  
Interview, 11.1.2012. 
 
By contrast, in four predominantly German-speaking cantons (path 2), the absence of a 
policy-client role conflict somewhat ‘rules out’ client meaninglessness. The street-level 
bureaucrat has a manageable workload (pres), and simultaneously thinks that the regulations 
are useless for the clients (CM), but, in principle, realizable for them (cc). The quote from the 
cantonal veterinarian in G, one of the cantons with the least agricultural sites, illustrates how 
this again leads the street-level bureaucrat to focus on enforcement as a means to raise the 
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farmers’ compliance with the policy: 
 
‘For the livestock holders, the problem is that the rules for the use of drugs are constricting 
(…) the reason why they don’t comply with the documentation requirements is pure lazyness 
and indifference, it’s not in bad faith (…) The farmers are insufficiently aware of what we are 
trying to accomplish with the OVMP (…) we have to raise their awareness.’  
Interview, 11.1.2012 
 
Figure 4 illustrates that the empirical evidence is highly consistent with the statement that 
these three paths are sufficient for appropriate performance. M is nonetheless a contradictory 
case, which displays path 2, but has deficient performance. Furthermore, the appropriate 
performance of three cantons (C, J, S) is not explained by this solution. Given the 
considerably higher coverage of these results, the theorized conditions have proven more apt 
for understanding appropriate performance than for previously explaining why street-level 
bureaucrats do not perform appropriately. 
 
-- Figure 4 about here -- 
 
In sum, the results mostly reflect the expected interplay of action prescriptions and resources, 
societal meaninglessness and the policy-professional role conflict (H2). Yet perceived 
resource scarcity does not play the vital role assumed in H1. H3 is supported and can be 
amended to client meaninglessness. The context-dependent role of factors referring to clients 
suggests that clients are indeed not the primary source of accountability for the Swiss street-
level bureaucrats.  
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Puzzling cases and limitations  
To shed light on the limitations of the study, I now compare the ‘most deviant cases’ for 
consistency and coverage of S, F and M to cantons with similar constellations of explanatory 
factors, but the opposite outcome. The aim is to identify additional factors that made the 
difference (cf. Schneider and Wagemann 2012, pp. 307ff). 
What distinguishes the unexplained case of S from H is that S aids other cantons with the 
inspections of veterinary premises – and so do the two other large cantons whose appropriate 
performance has remained unexplained. The high degree of professionalization, the higher 
service-orientedness and exposure of the activities of the veterinary office in S reportedly 
create a certain ‘role model’ effect and sensitize the staff. The role of the organizational 
context (Tummers et al. 2012a; Garrow and Grusky 2013) was neglected in this study because 
of weak prior empirical evidence (May and Winter 2009; Tummers et al. 2012b).  
Why is F is one of the worst-performing cantons, whereas N performs adequately? Contrary 
to the latter, F has international borders. Buying cheap veterinary drugs abroad is a 
widespread, difficult-to-detect illegal practice among livestock farmers. This practice is 
reportedly most salient in cantons that are close to an international border. Foreign 
veterinarians can also import small amounts of medicines without bureaucratic procedures (X 
2012). This leads the inspector of F to feel powerless to resolve the ‘real’ problem:  
 
‘We have a severe problem of transboundary traffic (…) we have to intervene in this matter. It 
crucially takes means to control and stop these people. (…) We don’t even know which 
veterinarians are legally allowed to practise in Switzerland.’ 
Interview, 13.2.2012. 
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Vicinity to borders may also be why performance is deficient in the other three unexplained 
cantons, including the contradictory case M. Although Tummers (2012) has found a weak 
linkage of feelings of powerlessness with change willingness, my analysis suggests that such 
feelings could negatively affect output performance. I conclude by discussing these results’ 
implications for the study of street-level performance. 
 
Conclusions 
This study has analysed Lipsky’s (1980) basic assertion that a lack of resources affects the 
output delivery of street-level bureaucrats negatively, yet depending on the workload and 
individual dilemmas they face. Based on the framework of public accountability (Hupe and 
Hill 2007) and through the application of QCA, I have merged and empirically applied the 
recently developed measures of a public service gap, policy alienation and role conflicts. 
These concepts have proven useful to explain the performance of Swiss veterinary inspectors.  
The study involves two major findings. First, the interplay of a tension between demand and 
supply (Hupe and Buffat 2014) with unfavourable individual perceptions emerging form the 
street-level bureaucrats’ multiple embeddedness has explained why street-level bureaucrats 
perform deficiently. The absence of a public service gap is also an important part of the story 
why street-level bureaucrats perform appropriately. Interestingly, results suggest that the 
objective caseloads of street-level bureaucrats help us understand output performance, more 
than the latter’s subjective perception of their budgetary and personnel resources. Hence, the 
Swiss case somewhat challenges the view that resource scarcities dominantly ‘virtually 
overdetermine’ street-level behaviour (Brodkin 2012, p. 943; Kosar 2011). It is not all about 
the resources. The results encourage the view that the combination of objectives and resources 
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shapes the setting in which street-level bureaucrats act (Johansson 2012, p. 1034; Hupe and 
Buffat 2014). Furthermore, one must consider the street-level bureaucrats’ multiple demands 
for behaviour (Hupe and Van der Krogt 2013, p. 66).  
Second, the Swiss street-level bureaucrats refer more consistently to the action prescriptions 
of the state, the profession, and broader society than to their clients when using their 
discretion. These results underscore Lipsky’s (1980, p. 47) assumption that street-level 
bureaucrats are not primarily held accountable by their clients if the latter cannot effectively 
discipline them. In addition to Keiser (2010), I find evidence for this even if direct interaction 
is given. My results do not contest the assertion that worker-client interactions are relevant in 
principle (e.g., Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003). However, they suggest that 
participatory accountability might not be predominant in ‘performance’ modes of 
implementation (Hupe and Hill 2007, p. 294), especially when an asymmetric power 
relationship is given as with inspectors who allocate sanctions (XY 2014). When clients are 
non-voluntary, the street-level bureaucrat’s feelings of societal meaninglessness (Tummers 
2012) and policy-professional role conflicts (Tummers et al. 2012b) in their interplay with 
contextual factors might be more decisive for output performance.  
Two factors were neglected in the assessment: first, the degree of professionalism in the 
organizational context (e.g., Garrow and Grusky 2013) matters for appropriate performance. 
Second, feelings of powerlessness (Tummers 2012) contribute to deficient performance. The 
results presented in this study have a limited generalizability, that is, a limited ability to 
‘travel’ to different country or policy contexts (Meyers and Vorsanger 2003, p. 251). A more 
fine-grained operationalization of ‘softer’ resources such as time or education (Riccucci et al. 
2004) and other sources of action prescriptions in combination with a diachronic design 
would enhance our understanding of different types of public service gaps (Hupe and Buffat 
2014).  
26 
 
Notwithstanding these limitations, the implementation of the OVMP illustrates that the 
workload faced by street-level bureaucrats and/or resource constraints might prominently 
range amongst the reasons for output performance. Thus, a profound understanding of street-
level performance should sensibly involve an explicit analysis of the differences between 
what is being asked of and offered to public servants. By accounting both for the demand and 
the supply side, the concept of a public service gap enables a differentiated and explicit 
analysis of efficiency pressures met by street-level workers, which easily ‘travels’ across 
organizational contexts. It should therefore definitively enter the analytical toolbox of 
researchers interested in the ways in which resource scarcity impacts on performance. The 
public service gap is a useful concept to capture this contextual aspect in comparisons of 
street-level bureaucracies. 
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Tables in text 
TABLE1 Conditions for performance and directional expectations 
 Condition Expected direction of isolated influence on 
appropriate performance (PERF) 
High action prescriptions 
PRES No expectation  
Insufficient action resources 
Res - 
Societal meaninglessness 
SM - 
Client meaninglessness 
CM - 
Policy-professional role conflict 
PC - 
Policy-client role conflict 
CC No expectation  
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TABLE 2 Outcome and conditions: measurement and calibration 
 
Set Measurement Full 
member-
ship  
Cross-
over 
point  
Full non-
member-
ship  
Appropriate 
performance 
(PERF) 1 % of farms inspected in 2010 8.5 5.8 1.5 
High action 
prescriptions 
(PRES) 1 
Number of farms to be inspected in 2010 (10% of  
livestock farms in canton) 450 275 100 
Sufficient action 
resources       
(RES) 2 
Are the personnel and economic resources at your 
disposal sufficient to perform the inspections as 
prescribed by the OVMP? 3 1 2.5 4 
Societal          
meaninglessness      
(SM)2 
Overall, do you find the inspection system/ the 
documentation provisions of the OVMP suitable 
to achieve the policy’s goals (correct use of 
veterinary drugs, food safety, animal health)?3 8 4.5 2 
Client             
meaninglessness      
(CM) 2 
How would you rate the usefulness of the  
 written agreement (TAM-Vereinbarung) that 
enables private veterinarians to dispense 
veterinary drugs to livestock farmers for on-
farm storage?4 
 required biannual visits by private 
veterinarians to livestock farms if a written 
agreement exists?4 8 4.5 2 
Policy-professional 
role conflict    
(PC)2 
Do you think the number of required inspections 
is adequate?3 
Do you find the content of the inspections as 
required by the OVMP to be practicable and does 
it make sense?3 8 4.5 2 
Policy-client        
role conflict     
(CC) 
Are the regulations of the OVMP realizable on 
livestock farms?3 4 2.5 1 
1 Source: ISVET.   2 Source: X 2012. 
3 Response categories: yes (1), rather yes (2), rather no (3), no (4). 
4 Response categories: useful (1), rather useful (2), rather not useful (3), not useful (4). 
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TABLE 3 Analysis of sufficiency for the outcome ‘deficient performance’  
Raw consistency threshold 0.733 to account for canton A. One contradictory truth table row is excluded (Table E 
online appendix). The next highest consistency score is 0.707.                           
 
TABLE 4 Analysis of sufficiency for the outcome ‘appropriate performance’  
Bold: contradictory case. 
Raw consistency threshold 0.926. The next highest consistency score is 0.881; the row contains only one case, 
which is contradictory. 
 
Figure legends 
FIGURE 1 Output performance in 2010 
 
Source: ISVET. 
 
Solution                 PRES*res*SM* CM *cc           +                            PRES* PC*CC                perf 
Single case 
coverage E, O, Q A  
Consistency 0.839 0.777  
Raw     
coverage 0.338 0.285  
Unique 
coverage 0.193 0.140  
Solution consistency         0.821 
Solution coverage 0.478 
Solution         pres*pc*CC       +            pres*CM*cc         +           RES*sm*cm*pc*CC            PERF 
Single case 
coverage I, R B, D, G, K, N, M P  
Consistency 0.933 0.931 0.911  
Raw 
coverage 0.272 0.456 0.255  
Unique   
coverage 0.064 0.263 0.116  
Solution consistency 0.928 
Solution coverage 0.651 
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FIGURE 2 Action resources and performance  
 
Cases situated below the diagonal are consistent with the statement of necessity (Schneider and Wagemann 
2012, p. 76). 
 
FIGURE 3 Sufficient conditions for deficient performance 
 
Cases situated above the diagonal are fully consistent. In the upper left quadrant are deviant cases for coverage, 
in the lower right quadrant are contradictory cases. Cases in the lower left quadrant are not directly relevant 
(Schneider and Wagemann 2012, pp. 67ff, 308). 
 
FIGURE 4 Sufficient conditions for appropriate performance 
 
Cases situated above the diagonal are fully consistent. In the upper left quadrant are deviant cases for coverage, 
in the lower right quadrant are contradictory cases. Cases in the lower left quadrant are not directly relevant 
(Schneider and Wagemann 2012, pp. 67ff, 308). 
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Online supplementary data 
TABLE A Raw data matrix  
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A 4.81 434.2 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 
B 6.45 181.4 2 3 2 4 4 1 2 2 
C 8.91 86.4 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 
D 7.21 30.5 2 2 2 2 3 1 2 1 
E 3.26 386.5 4 4 3 4 1 3 4 1 
F 1.59 44.1 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 
G 8.38 52.5 3 2 3 3 4 3 3 2 
H 4.9 312 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 
I 7.13 131.9 4 4 3 1 4 3 1 3 
J 8.69 605.3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
K 10.38 89.6 1 2 1 4 4 2 1 2 
L 5.43 546.8 1 3 3 1 2 1 2 2 
M 5.09 51.1 2 1 3 2 3 2 1 2 
N 6.33 140.5 1 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 
O 1.6 444.5 4 3 2 2 3 3 1 2 
P 9.05 412.2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 
Q 3.55 414.2 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 1 
R 6.13 257.8 2 3 3 1 4 1 3 4 
S 9.9 323.6 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 
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TABLE B Fuzzy set scores  
Canton PERF PRES RES SM CM PC CC GAP 
A 0,33 0,94 0,95 0,14 0,35 0,61 0,73 0,05 
B 0,67 0,17 0,73 0,61 0,95 0,14 0,27 0,17 
C 0,97 0,04 0,95 0,05 0,14 0,05 0,05 0,04 
D 0,83 0,01 0,73 0,35 0,61 0,14 0,05 0,01 
E 0,15 0,87 0,05 0,89 0,61 0,89 0,05 0,87 
F 0,05 0,02 0,73 0,14 0,14 0,05 0,27 0,02 
G 0,95 0,02 0,27 0,61 0,89 0,78 0,27 0,02 
H 0,35 0,65 0,73 0,14 0,35 0,35 0,27 0,27 
I 0,81 0,08 0,05 0,89 0,61 0,35 0,73 0,08 
J 0,96 1,0 0,27 0,35 0,35 0,35 0,27 0,73 
K 0,99 0,04 0,95 0,14 0,95 0,14 0,27 0,04 
L 0,44 0,99 0,95 0,78 0,14 0,14 0,27 0,05 
M 0,38 0,02 0,73 0,35 0,61 0,14 0,27 0,02 
N 0,64 0,09 0,95 0,14 0,61 0,14 0,05 0,05 
O 0,05 0,95 0,05 0,61 0,61 0,35 0,27 0,95 
P 0,97 0,91 0,95 0,35 0,35 0,35 0,73 0,05 
Q 0,17 0,92 0,27 0,61 0,61 0,61 0,05 0,73 
R 0,59 0,43 0,73 0,78 0,61 0,35 0,95 0,27 
S 0,99 0,7 0,73 0,35 0,14 0,35 0,05 0,27 
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TABLE C Necessary conditions for performance 
Condition  
Appropriate performance (PERF) Deficient performance (perf) 
Consistency  Coverage Consistency  Coverage 
PRES 0.442 0.562 0.706 0.615 
pres 0.698 0.777 0.498 0.378 
RES 0.763 0.732 0.660 0.432 
res 0.408 0.637 0.591 0.630 
GAP 0.222 0.535 0.474 0.780 
gap 0.908* 0.716 0.717 0.386 
SM 0.517 0.705 0.623 0.580 
sm 0.692 0.729 0.683 0.491 
CM 0.666 0.781 0.654 0.524 
cm 0.594 0.716 0.727 0.598 
PC 0.400 0.719 0.548 0.673 
pc 0.818 0.726 0.771 0.467 
CC 0.413 0.795 0.422 0.553 
cc 0.768 0.661 0.844 0.495 
GAP = PRES*res. Consistency threshold ≥ 0.9 (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, pp. 144ff). 
* Trivial necessary condition; J is a contradictory case. 
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TABLE D Truth table: Analysis of sufficiency for appropriate performance (PERF) 
PRES RES SM CM PC CC PERF Number Consistency 
0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1.000 
1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0.976 
0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0.966 
0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0.962 
0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0.961 
0 1 0 1 0 0 1 4 0.926 
1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0.881 
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0.870 
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.853 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0.830 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.785 
1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0.673 
1 0 1 1 1 0 0 2 0.574 
Technically, sufficient performance was assessed prior to deficient performance (the sequence does not alter the 
results). 
Raw consistency threshold: 0.926.  
Directional expectations: RES  PERF, sm  PERF, cm  PERF, pc  PERF. 
Complex solution: pres*RES*CM*pc*cc + pres*SM*CM*pc*CC + pres*res*SM*CM*PC*cc + 
PRES*RES*sm*cm*pc*CC  PERF (solution consistency 0.942, solution coverage 0.637). 
Parsimonious solution: pres*CM + pc*CC  PERF (solution consistency 0.891, solution coverage 0.691). 
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TABLE E Truth table: Analysis of sufficiency for deficient performance (perf) 
PRES RES SM CM PC CC perf Number Consistency 
1 0 1 1 1 0 1 2 0.822 
1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0.790 
0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0.748 
1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0.733 
0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0.707 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.643 
0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0.643 
1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.630 
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0.627 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0.623 
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.616 
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0.613 
0 1 0 1 0 0 0 4 0.557 
Raw consistency threshold: 0.733, exclusion of contradictory truth table row 3. 
The data display tied logically redundant prime implicants (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, pp. 108ff). The 
prime implicant chosen for the solution formula is the one displaying a public service gap, which is of theoretical 
interest here. The alternative parsimonious and intermediate solutions are available upon request. 
Untenable assumptions: pres*CM + pc*CC  perf. 
Prime implicant = PRES*res*SM*cc. 
Directional expectations: res  perf, SM  perf, CM  perf, PC  perf. 
Complex solution: 
PRES*res*SM*CM* cc + PRES*RES*sm*cm*PC*CC  perf (solution consistency 0.816, solution coverage 
0.461). 
Parsimonious solution (untenable assumptions excluded from minimization):  
cm*PC + PRES*PC + PRES*CM*cc + PRES*res*SM*cc  perf (solution consistency 0.780, solution 
coverage 0.586). 
 
 
